











































Theoretical and methodological considerations for the study of
banal and everyday nationalism
Citation for published version:
Hearn, J & Antonsich, M 2018, 'Theoretical and methodological considerations for the study of banal and
everyday nationalism', Nations and Nationalism, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 594-605.
https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12419
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/nana.12419
Link:






This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Hearn, J., and Antonsich, M. (2018) Theoretical and
methodological considerations for the study of banal and everyday nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 24:
594–605., which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12419 This article may be used
for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.




Theoretical and methodological considerations for the study of 





This themed section grapples with the problem of how we find evidence for 
‘everyday nationalism’.  As the range of work in this area has blossomed in recent 
years, it is a timely intervention.  In their introduction Fox and Ginderachter begin to 
lay out the problem through a couple of distinctions. First they distinguish between 
macro and micro approaches to the study of nationalism, locating their problem at 
the micro end.  They suggest that ‘macro-structural’ or ‘macro-historical’ approaches 
have focused on questions of the historical origins and formation of modern 
nationalism, the role of states and their various institutions, and encompassing 
political economic processes.  The everyday focus is seen as a micro counterpoint to 
this, looking at how nations and nationalism are made from the bottom up rather 
than the top down.  They also distinguish between ‘banal nationalism’, as articulated 
influentially by Michael Billig (1995), and ‘everyday nationalism’.  They locate both 
these foci at the more micro end, but suggest that banal nationalism is more 
concerned with the implicit, largely subliminal discursive forms that nationalism 
takes, that can be observed and brought to light by researchers.  In contrast, 
everyday nationalism focuses more on the ‘practical accomplishment of ordinary 
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people doing ordinary things’.  It is about human agency, no matter how small and 
casual.  People call forth these national categories, find them meaningful, and act in 
terms of them in certain situations.   
 
In this concluding article, we would like to reflect on the endeavour of searching for 
evidence of the ‘unseen’, ‘unheard’, and ‘unnoticed’ of the nation. While we are 
genuinely sympathetic to this research agenda, we also would like to advance some 
theoretical and methodological considerations which we believe might help refine 
this endeavour. We start by pointing to the necessity of bridging macro and micro 
approaches to the study of nationalism. We reflect on this issue by looking more 
specifically at the notion of individual agency, which is the characterising feature of 
the everyday approach to the nation. We argue that emphasising the centrality of 
individual agency would not lead to a deeper understanding of nationalism unless it 
is studied in relation to the social organisational context within which individual 
practices take place. This point is also carried forward in our scrutiny of how 
everyday nationalism approaches questions of ‘meaning’ and ‘identity’. Any attempt 
at addressing the ‘evidence problem’ should in fact be clear about the rationale for 
collecting that evidence, because if meanings orient social actions then again a focus 
on the micro cannot be sufficient to explain the thrust of the nation in shaping social 
life. Similarly, (national) identity should be studied in its individual and social 
components. Therefore, everyday nationalism’s focus on the individual should once 
again not be detached from the social organisational contexts (e.g. families, 
workplaces, educational spaces, etc.) which mediate more structural (macro) 
dimensions of the nation. An additional question is also related to the notion of 
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‘legitimacy’. In fact, while banal nationalism clearly works for legitimising the idea of 
the nation-state in the eyes of its members, it is not as clear how everyday 
nationalism stands in relation to the same question. Finally, we reflect on the implicit 
assumption which largely operates within both banal and everyday nationalism, 
namely the idea of a nation defined in the singular. We argue instead for a research 
programme which explores how the everyday brings to the fore a plurality of 
understandings of nation, thus opening up a category traditionally depicted in mono-
cultural tones. 
 
2. Individual agency between the micro and macro of the nation 
 
The first question we might ask is: how micro is banal nationalism?  While certainly 
there was no large historical or political economic thesis in Billig’s book, the patterns 
of discourse and habitus he was directing attention to are very large.  They are 
discursive structures within which people act, even while being mostly unaware of 
those structures.  This was the point, that because the national discourse is so 
multiform and pervasive, it is well entrenched and ready to be mobilised when 
politics heats up.  The banal can become ‘hot’ (see Christian, Dowler, & Cuomo, 
2015; Jones & Merriman, 2009).  We should be wary of a taken-for-granted 
association of the discursive with the micro.  While every actual moment of 
‘meaningfulness’ may have to take place in some individual’s head, or an interacting 
group of individuals’ heads, nonetheless we can study banal national discourses as 
macro-phenomena, evidenced in extensive rhetorical patterns that the researcher 
has learned to read, without direct recourse to the minds and meaning-making of 
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actual actors.  It may be that this claim is less true of everyday nationalism, and that 
is part of the distinction being made here.  Everyday nationalism may be defined by 
the aim to study the acts of meaning-making, and how they work, rather than the 
large patterns they instantiate. 
 
This directs us closer to the classic question of agency.  If nations and nationalism are 
human creations, then surely its ultimate origins lie in those on going acts of 
instantiation that make them real from day to day.  This would seem to be the basic 
idea that underlies the everyday approach defined here.  And, it is an assumption, or 
at least bias, basic to various forms of micro-sociological analysis: phenomenological, 
ethnomethodological, symbolic interactionist, and so on.  Pursuing this point 
requires us to think more carefully about what we mean by agency. 
 
In recent years there has been a tendency in some quarters to reduce agency to 
action, delinking it from questions of will and intention.  In formulating his theory of 
structuration Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1984) tended to treat agency as any kind of 
human action, regardless of intention.  Actor-Network theorists such as Bruno Latour 
(Latour, 1987) have argued against treating agency as specifically human, extending 
the role of ‘actor’ to machines, animals, even mathematical formulae—anything that 
does something that enters into a causal nexus.  Indeed the difference between 
agency and causation tends to dissolve in this approach.  The everyday approach to 
nationalism doesn’t seem to go to this extreme.  But that means it does have to deal 
with questions of will and intention in agency, and that’s where it gets difficult.  To 
take a standard example, sticking with human action in this context, if people do not 
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speak a language on a daily basis, it tends to die out.  The action of speaking carried 
on by myriad individuals sustains the language, keeps it going and evolving.  But this 
is rarely the intention of the speakers, who are just going about their normal 
business.  They speak with intentions, but the intentions are to get other things 
done, not to support the language they are using itself.  The latter is a side effect.   
 
Fox and Ginderachter note the ‘now-you-see-it, now-you don’t’ aspect of everyday 
nationalism.  It becomes visible when it is a salient frame of action, or something in 
regard to which people deliberately act in various small ways, but it is always prone 
to sink back below consciousness, to become more ‘banal’ again.  This way of 
conceiving the object of study would seem to have a lot in common with the 
example of language.  Sometimes people treat their language as the object of their 
actions (e.g. using ‘s/he’), sometimes they are consciously using it to achieve some 
extra-linguistic end (‘that’s an order!’), and most of the time they pursue their ends 
unconsciously relying on the taken-for-granted medium of language.  Similarly there 
are distinctions to be teased apart, between when nationalism enters into everyday 
consciousness as an object of intention and action, however fleetingly, when it 
frames actions as a consciously invoked category but is not itself the point of the 
action, and when it operates as an implicit, invisible background assumption.  For 
instance, consider the differences between: an American going out of their way to 
indicate their awareness of politics around the globe to counter stereotypes of 
American parochialism; knowing which line to get into to pass customs when 
entering a country; and seeking professional accreditation according to national 
regulating bodies, or seeking a national tax rebate.  Each of these modes of acting in 
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national terms implies different kinds of evidence.  More fundamentally, they may 
deserve different kinds of weight in a theoretical account of how nationalism is 
grounded in everyday action. 
 
There is another issue here.  Discussions of agency often proceed with an assumed 
paradigm of the individual agent, and a micro focus will tend to converge with this 
assumption.  However, much of the human agency that matters in this world is 
carried out not by individuals, but various kinds of groups and organisations (for 
instance states and political parties obviously, but all kinds of civil society formations 
as well).  While these larger agents may aggregate the wills and intentions of 
individuals, the wholes are inevitably greater than the sum of their parts (Kaufmann, 
2017).  Nationalism as social action may be in key respects an emergent property of 
complexly organised behaviour that cannot be disaggregated to more micro levels of 
analysis.  The bedrock of individual agency, and social settings of direct interaction 
among individuals, while they may reveal specific aspects of how people connect to 
nationalism, may not be adequate to explain everyday nationalism in general 
precisely because it is a product of its social organisational context in the first place.  
 
To illustrate this point, Hearn (2017) found, in his ethnographic study of the merger 
of the Bank of Scotland and the Halifax to form HBOS, that perceived differences in 
national character were sometimes invoked to help explain tensions emanating from 
differences in the business cultures of the two banks.  In such cases, it is very difficult 
to say whether the evidence of national identity one encounters in the words and 
actions of those studied is an expression of personal national identities, or 
7 
 
something elicited by the salient organisational context of merger.  Moreover, an 
institution such as the Bank of Scotland has (or perhaps had) a strategic awareness 
of its ‘Scottishness’, which it cultivates and capitalises on.  The agencies of the 
organisation, and of its members, are difficult to tease apart. To point to various 
kinds of organisations as agents in themselves is not to reduce individual agency to 
an effect of structural processes, but rather to acknowledge that it is routinely 
invested in and shaped by larger collectivities. 
 
To be sure, social organisations vary in scale and scope, and are not to be confused 
with social structures in the sense of, for instance, class, race and gender hierarchies, 
large demographic patterns, or economic and legal systems.  But people generally 
relate to and find their place within such structures through the mediation of social 
organisations which more directly shape their lives and mobilise interests and 
identities.  And for most human beings, the largest and most encompassing 
organisation mediating their relationship to those structures is the modern state.   But 
the key point here is that while the everyday enactment of nationalism isn’t 
prescribed by social structure, it is framed and shaped by more immediate forms of 
social organization that tie people into such structures. 
 
3. On meaning, legitimacy and identity 
 
The focus on everyday nationalism is also presented as a necessary way to get at 
‘meaning’, and what makes nations meaningful to ordinary people in their daily lives.  
And if, in Weberian style, we see social action as by definition meaningfully oriented, 
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then this has to be a concomitant of the concern with agency.  But why does 
meaning matter exactly?  There are at least two answers to this question.  A classic 
humanist answer is that we want to understand the experiences of others, to be able 
to identify with their view of the world, because this enriches us and expands our 
consciousness.  In this formulation the merits of ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) are 
often counter-posed to the preoccupation with ‘explanation’ (Hewitson 2015: 149-
79, Little 1991: 68-87).  This was a part of Weber’s answer, but only part.  Another 
very important reason for his interest in and emphasis on the importance of 
meaning was that social action is fundamental to matters of causation in human 
affairs, and we cannot account for social action if we do not know how it is 
meaningfully oriented.  But the larger quarry was still causal explanation (Käsler 
1988).  And this points us back to the larger organisational contexts in which 
meanings are often articulated and through which social action is often amplified 
and focused.  If we are only interested in sympathetically grasping what nations and 
nationalism mean for ordinary people as an end in itself that’s one thing, but if this is 
a stage in a larger process of causal explanation, then we may ultimately be obliged 
to work our way back up from the micro to the macro.  A social universe in which 
nations and nationalism are meaningful objects orienting action may not be the 
result of myriad small-scale acts of attributing meaning. It may be itself an emergent 
property of a larger social and cultural context, which can only be understood by 
examining the larger currents and processes of human history. This might therefore 
open the question of the heuristic value of a research method aimed at studying 




The ‘evidence problem’ posed here has interesting parallels with one encountered in 
regard to the study of power.  How do we know power exists apart from when it is 
manifestly demonstrated by success in a contest?  Where does it go, or does it exist 
hidden in some latent form (Hearn, 2012: 13-15)?  The answer would seem to be 
that we reasonably attribute power to any object that routinely demonstrates such 
success, but that we don’t expect it to be constantly in evidence.  The search for 
everyday nationalism would seem to have a similar problematic.  If people 
intermittently act in terms of the nation, does everyday nationalism abide only in 
those moments, or are these taken as evidence of an underlying and relatively 
constant condition—something more like Billig’s banal nationalism?  Is the nation 
itself created in these moments of expression, or do they simply evidence a nation 
which is constantly underlying?  Systematic investigation may require taking an 
initial position on this basic conceptual question.  
 
The study of ‘legitimacy’ is also bedevilled by a similar problem.  When authority is 
working smoothly and unchallenged, it can be difficult to tell how it works, or if it’s 
really even there.  Do people obey because they believe, or willingly accept, out of 
habitual acquiescence, or out of sheer ignorance?  Legitimacy is most evident in the 
breach, when it breaks and fails, and we can ask what it is exactly that has stopped 
working.  Here the comparison of conceptual problems is not just formal, but  
substantive.  Because the idea of banal nationalism at least, is related to how nations 
and nationalism achieve legitimacy by being naturalised, by becoming part of the 
‘doxa’.  Does the idea of everyday nationalism share this concern with legitimacy, 
with how power relations within society, on up to the state, are rendered natural 
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and acceptable, or is it a relatively more ‘apolitical’ concept?  This is a critical 
question for defining what it is we are talking about here, and how it might be 
evidenced. 
 
Fox and Ginderachter also suggest that the ‘everyday’ approach is important for 
understanding how national identity works.  Much hinges on what we mean by 
‘identity’.  Minimally, this term tends to cover two rather different things.  On the 
one hand, we talk about identities as large social categories into which we place and 
classify people, in terms of nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, class, and endless 
other social taxonomies built into culture and language.  On the other hand, we talk 
about identity as an aspect of the individual self, every person having a unique sense 
of who they are.  More broadly, social identity is precisely about how we connect 
our personal identities to these larger categories, about how the categories become 
more or less salient according to how they relate to and explain personal 
experiences (see Hearn 2013).  So it may be that part of what everyday nationalism 
provides evidence of, is how this happens.  It helps show us how individual selves get 
‘sutured’ (Hall 1996: 5-6) into taxonomies of identities, and how strange, subtle and 
quixotic this process can be.  Correspondingly, the difference between the ‘everyday’ 
focus and the ‘banal’ focus, may have something to do with the difference between 
the acts of identification made by concrete selves (sometimes unconsciously), and 
the social and cognitive embedding of those categories and taxonomies through 
social discourse.  Having said this, as suggested at the end of the previous section, 
we shouldn’t forget that this polarity of self and social category is mediated by 
myriad social organisational contexts—families, friendship networks, workplaces, 
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associations, and so on—that help steer selves into and out of these categories.  The 
search for everyday nationalism, which frequently uses ethnographic and micro-
sociological methods, is framed by these specific social contexts, which put a certain 
spin, and contextual meaning, on the quotidian acts of national practice.  The social 
researcher searching for evidence of national identity in the everyday, needs to be 
alert to these nuances, to the contextual specificity of the evidence they are 
collecting. 
 
4. Moving from the singular to the plural nation 
 
Until now we have worked with an understanding of the nation in the singular, as 
this is indeed a recurrent understanding in numerous studies of banal and everyday 
nationalism. Yet, scholars wishing to unearth the unreflexive dispositions towards 
the nation and/or its practical (re)enactment in the everyday should also consider 
whether this is really the case. It is particularly noticeable, for instance, that in Banal 
Nationalism Billig clearly affirms that “different factions, whether classes, religions, 
regions, genders or ethnicities, always struggle for the power to speak for the nation, 
and to present their particular voice as the voice of the national whole” (Billig, 1995: 
71). Yet, despite this acknowledgment, the book conceptually relies on a nation 
defined in the singular. The “different classes, religions, regions, genders or 
ethnicities” do not produce a multivocality of national meanings, but they battle in 
order to be able to exclusively speak for the nation. In other words, Billig’s view of a 
heterogeneous national audience does not translate into an open acknowledgement 
of the plurality of the nation (Antonsich, 2016a; Skey, 2009). Similarly, in the highly 
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celebrated book by Edensor (Edensor, 2002), everyday nationalism offers an image 
of nation which is blind to the ethnic, racial, and religious diversity which populate it. 
The tendency is instead to look at the material and performative reproduction of a 
stable and mono-cultural nation – a national mainstream which goes unchallenged. 
Also Fox  (2017), in a recent article which largely echoes the present quest for 
unearthing the underground processes of nationalism, operates with the notion of a 
singular nation. In fact, implicit in his idea of ‘repair work’ after a breach has 
unsettled the national routine is the notion of mainstream: the nation is brought 
back to its ‘normality’. Yet, ‘normality’ is obviously far from being a politically neutral 
concept, as it is instead imbued with a cultural mainstream that hardens the national 
border to expunge people, objects and actions which are perceived to subvert that 
stable condition (Antonsich, 2016b). The restoration of a mainstreamed, normalized 
nation is thus instrumental to the reproduction of a hegemonic national group which 
polices the boundaries and the meanings of the nation (Hage, 2000). 
  
This point is important when we come to reflect on the purpose of the ‘evidence 
problem’. The risk, in fact, is to look for evidence which inadvertently contributes to 
essentialize the object under study. Bringing to light the underground work of banal 
nationalism, however illuminating it might be in terms of understanding the 
mechanisms of the reproduction of the nation, would also leave unchallenged the 
very idea of a stable, singular and state-centric nation at work in banal nationalism 
and, in some cases, also in everyday nationalism. More profitable, instead, would be 
to look for evidence which troubles the smooth reproduction of nationalism or, if we 
were to use Fox’s (2017) terminology, to make an alternative use of ‘breaches’. 
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Rather than focusing on the ‘repair work’, our invitation is to fully embrace those 
breaches for their transformative potential. For instance, the battles to be 
homosexual and serve in the US military forces (Kier, 1998), to be a woman soldier 
and performing combat roles (King, 2015), to re-write school curricula so to 
accommodate colonial and post-colonial histories (Modood, 2007), to be Arab 
activists and at the same time being regarded as loyal British citizens (Nagel & 
Staeheli, 2008), to perform ethnic food practices in Minnesota (Trudeau, 2006), to 
be Black Italians and celebrate the victory of the Azzurri without being harassed 
(Khouma, 2010) can all be regarded as acts of national transgressions or, better, acts 
which stretch the national imaginary beyond its consolidated boundaries. Rather 
than focusing, though, on the ‘repair work’ which would reproduce the banal, 
‘normal’, mainstreamed nation, our suggestion would be to attend to the ways these 
acts open up the singularity of the nation and challenge the hegemony of the ethno-
cultural group that sustains it. However normative this call might sound, it is actually 
an invitation to take the act of breaching itself as generative of plural understandings 
of nation. Far from a unified site, the nation is in fact also a product of everyday 
contestation and disagreement, an extremely dynamic and ambiguous process made 
of multiple, conflicting ordinary voices. Not listening to this polyphonic production 
would be to treat the nation as something out of history, something which does not 
adjust to the changing of people and times. 
 
On a related note, we should also consider how the ‘evidence problem’ might also 
challenge something which, in Billig’s understanding of banal nationalism, works as a 
normative assumption, namely the fact that there is nothing positive about the 
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nation. This latter is in fact treated as a mere symbolic mechanism in the functioning 
of nationalism which, in turn, is never benign (Billig, 1995: 6-7). Behind every state 
with their ‘vast armaments’ (Billig, 1995: 7), there is a nation which can be used to 
fuel and justify the use of those armaments. The malignity of the nation is also 
perceived in its inherent exclusionary thrust (Billig, 2016), as it is articulated around 
a ‘we’ intrinsically opposed to ‘them’. Yet, there is more to nations than a search for 
evidence might reveal. The nation in fact also works to motivate and sustain civic 
engagement (Brubaker, 2004: 121-122), social solidarity (Calhoun, 2007: 171), and 
economic redistribution (Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010; Miller & Ali, 
2014). More recently, the adoption of affect in nationalism studies (Closs Stephens, 
2016; Merriman & Jones, 2016; Militz & Schurr, 2016; Sumartojo, 2016; Wetherell, 
McCreanor, McConville, Barnes, & le Grice, 2015) also expands on narratives of the  
personal, intimate, and emotional nation (Cohen, 1982; Hearn, 2007; Thompson, 
2001), which go beyond a state-centric and malign register, intrinsically associated 
with a ‘we’ vs. ‘them’ opposition. Being open to surprise when looking for evidence 
(Agnew, 2006) might therefore reveal more positive sides to the nation than what 





In 1995, when Billig’s seminal book was published, hot nationalisms were in full 
swing. The Yugoslavian break-up led to bloody inter-ethnic conflicts, the Rwandan 
genocide left about one million people dead, and only a few years earlier the United 
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States claimed a new world order on the ashes of the ill-fated Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. While the world was burning ‘out there’, quiet and peaceful – relatively 
speaking – was life ‘in here’. The importance of Billig’s argument was to show the 
links between these two worlds: the very possibility of hot nationalism – Billig 
argued – relies in the silent, unreflexive, daily working of banal nationalism.  
Today the context within which Banal Nationalism was written has changed. Hot 
nationalisms are no longer ‘out there’, but pervade daily life ‘in here’. The financial 
crisis, the European crisis, the migration crisis, and the terrorist crisis inform what we 
daily watch, hear, and, more often than not, hotly discuss. Government and public 
answers to all these crises are also nationally inflected. “Restore our sovereignty and 
democracy”, “Control our own borders”, “Preserve British rights and values” or 
“America first” are some of the current calls for a conscious and active re-
nationalization of national societies in the Western world and beyond (Antonsich, 
2017). In this context, one might wonder what space is left for a nation banally 
reproduced in the everyday life. And yet, given the continuum between banal and 
hot nationalism, it is legitimate to assume that even in the present conjecture the 
nation continues to operate unnoticed in the routine happening of social life. Thus, 
the ‘evidence problem’ is certainly a legitimate object of enquiry.  
 
In this article we have attended to this problem, trying to explicate its different 
facets. In fact, it would be more accurate to talk of ‘evidence problems’ in the plural, 
because people indeed ‘do’ different things with the nation. In fact, following the 
original insight of Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a), people not only talk about, but also 
talk with the nation. Accordingly, students of everyday nationhood should 
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distinguish between when the nation is a mindful object of intention and action, 
when it is a discursive category consciously activated to orient action, or when it 
operates subliminally, as an unnoticed background in daily life. All these instances 
imply different types of evidence.  
 
A second consideration relates to the tendency of everyday nationalism to see itself 
as a point of departure from the more traditional, historical approaches which have 
long characterised nationalism studies. In fact, while the latter are mainly concerned 
with questions of origin (‘when’) and nature (‘what’) of the nation, the former 
privileges questions of reproduction (‘how’), context (‘where’), and actors (‘who’), 
generally adopting ethnographic rather than historical methods (Antonsich, 2015). 
However true this might be, we would like to caution against the possible risk of 
keeping macro-structural approaches separated from micro investigation of 
everyday life. As we have argued in this article, individual agency should be studied 
in relation to social organizational contexts. Any nation is not and cannot be only the 
product of myriad individuals attributing sense to the nation itself, but an emergent 
property of complexly organized behavior. Thus, joining the debate between Smith 
(2008) and Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008b), we would call for further empirical research 
which could bridge the apparent divide between ‘macro’ (structure) and ‘micro’ 
(individual agency) in nationalism studies (for a recent attempt in this direction see 
(Kaufmann, 2017). This might also be relevant to understand how everyday 
nationalism positions itself in relation to the legitimacy question. In fact, while banal 
nationalism clearly shows how the mundane, unwaved flag contributes to the 
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naturalization of the link between nation and state, everyday nationalism is more 
ambiguous in this regard, avoiding dealing directly with this ‘political’ question. 
 
A third and final consideration regards the question whether how we pose the 
‘evidence problem’ helps reinforce the idea of a stable, fixed, normalized nation or 
points to the open, dynamic and contested nature of this construct. It is a question 
regarding the purpose of evidence, as the risk might be to essentialize the object of 
our study rather than critically interrogating issues of national (re)production. 
 
While we remain very sympathetic to the endeavour of looking for evidence for the 
banal and everyday happening of the nation, we have also tried to reflect on the 
multiple theoretical and methodological facets of the evidence problem, as well as 
its purpose. As a great part of the Western world seems to experience today a 
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